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Abstract 
 
This paper constructs an empirical model of spouse selection based on Becker’s efficient marriage 
market hypothesis to examine how equilibrium sorting takes place in marriage markets in India. It 
finds that education of the groom and age of the bride has the largest effect on matching behavior 
in India. More importantly, it finds that marital transfers from brides and their families to grooms 
and their families increase the likelihood of women marrying men of similar type.  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
his paper examines how equilibrium sorting takes place in marriage markets in India. It constructs an 
empirical model of spouse selection based on Becker’s (1973) efficient marriage market hypothesis, 
in which stable assignments of marriage partners are derived from a utility maximization problem. 
Utility, in this model, depends on consumption of commodities produced jointly by the husband and wife according 
to a household production function. Marriage assignments are stable if no matched individual would rather be single 
and if no unmatched pair prefers each other to their assigned partners. Marriage markets are efficient if men and 
women are matched in such a way that maximizes total household commodity output over all marriages. By specify-
ing a marital production function and introducing the influence of individual characteristics in the matching technol-
ogy, this paper creates a matching algorithm and uses the estimated parameters to examine positive assortative mat-
ing with respect to nonmarket characteristics.  
 
The theoretical literature on who marries whom treats marriage as a voluntary arrangement between men 
and women (see Bergstrom 1997, Mortenson 1988 and Weiss 1977 for surveys of the literature on marriage, match-
ing and economics of the family). It is natural, then, for economists to analyze the assignment of partners within a 
market framework (Becker 1991; Gale and Shapley 1962). In Becker’s model, marriage occurs only if the gains 
from marriage are positive and partners believe that the utility of being married is higher than the utility of remain-
ing single. A marriage market forms from competition among single men and women seeking mates. Marital 
matches are responsive to the personal traits of individuals, which influence their market and nonmarket productivi-
ty and are inputs to the household production function. The marriage market functions by choosing the optimal sort-
ing of men and women that maximizes the average gain over all marriages. This maximization process yields two 
possible outcomes: positive assortative mating--likes pair with likes--with respect to complementary traits (age, race, 
education) and negative assortative mating--opposites match-- with respect to substitute traits (wages and hours 
worked). 
 
A large literature exists on patterns of marital matching on a wide variety of attributes, with most research 
produced by sociologists and psychologists. While, Becker’s prediction of negative assortative mating on spouse’s 
wages and hours worked has received little empirical support (Zhang and Lui 2003; Nakostein and Zimmer 2001; 
Lam 1988), positive assortative mating has been more commonly observed, as indicated by the conventional meas-
ure of simple correlations, in the literature. Positive correlations are reported for intelligence, age, education, race, 
nonmarket income, religion, ethnic origin, and height of spouses (Mare 1991; Epstein and Guttman 1984). While 
others have studied patterns of marital sorting, this paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, with the 
exception of Suen and Lui (1999) and Jepsen and Jepsen (2002) empirical studies on marital assignments have fo-
T 
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cused on a single trait only. The matching process is a function of multiple characteristics that individuals bring to 
the marriage; such a simplification would, therefore, not be practical. To address this issue, a vector of traits is used 
to capture a potential mate’s attractiveness in the marriage market. The multivariate technique is then utilized to not 
only assess patterns of assortative mating with respect to any particular trait, but also to isolate factors that are im-
portant in selecting mates in India.  
 
Second, despite the repeated usage of Becker’s theory of marriage the literature on marriage and matching 
has completely ignored his hypothesis that marriage markets maximize aggregate marital output, i.e., marriage mar-
kets are efficient. In contrast, like Suen and Lui (1999) this paper utilizes Becker’s framework of marital sorting to 
find the optimal male-female pairing that maximizes the sum of marital output.  Finally, for any given demographi-
cally defined aggregate of individuals, assortative matching requires access to a sufficient pool of members of oppo-
site sex with similarly defined characteristics. However, the regulatory systems of Indian society enforce a variety of 
norms and sometimes specific rules about who may marry whom. For example, marriages are arranged by the par-
ents of the prospective spouses, are subject to certain rules of caste, kinship, religion and geographic region and re-
quire the bride’s parents to provide a dowry to the groom and his household (Banerjee 1999). As a result, these so-
cial constraints may impose barriers on mate selection and negatively influence the availability of partners, thus in-
directly affecting the degree of assortative mating. To address this issue, the paper constructs a “marriage index” for 
each male and female in the sample on the basis of his or her observed traits. The marriage index which is a measure 
of an individual’s desirability as a mate is then utilized to form a match matrix to examine the extent of assortative 
mating in India.  
 
Results support Becker’s predictions of positive assortative mating with respect to age and schooling. In 
examining matching patterns to isolate the factors that affect marital choice results indicate that while years of 
schooling of the groom has the largest effect on matching behavior, it is the age of the bride that affects mate selec-
tion and the organization of marriage markets in India. Furthermore, equilibrium sorting indicates that thirty-four 
percent of the marriages in India occur between men and women of similar type. Most importantly, results show that 
dowry increases the likelihood of women marrying men of similar type. This is an important result, as it lends sup-
port to the equalizing differences role of marital arrangements in India (Dalmia 2003).  
 
2.  Estimation Methodology 
 
Consider two types of agents to be matched, males )(M  and females )(F .  Let N  denote the number of 
women in the marriage market (which also equals the number of men). Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to 
their observed and unobserved traits such as age, education, and income. It is assumed that these attributes, which 
indicate an individual’s type, can be collectively represented by one-dimensional indices iM  for male i  and jF  
for female j .  These indices measure the marriageability of an individual in terms of qualities that make him or her 
a desirable spouse in the marriage market. Consequently, it is assumed that a higher type individual is always pre-
ferred and that each agent tries to find a partner who maximizes his or her well being, with well being measured by 
the consumption of household produced commodities )(Z  such as, love, companionship, quality and quantity of 
children. The match quality is measured by the household production, with the couple's types as inputs to match 
production. To allow for both increasing returns to scale and complementarity between the couples type, the match 
production is assumed to be the product of couple's type: 
 
ijjiij FMZ    (1) 
 
 Single observed characteristics such as height, wage and education etc. do not offer a perfect measure on 
marriageability of an individual in the marriage market. Other characteristics of marriage partners such as beauty, 
personality, and temperament are also important to the choice of a mate. However, not all of the characteristics of 
participants in the marriage market may be observable by the researcher hence, the measurement error term, ij  in 
equation (1). 
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Let males iM  and females jF  be characterized by their age (A) and years of schooling (S). That is: 
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where superscripts m  and f  refer to male and female. Using equations (1) and (2), the match quality can be writ-
ten as  
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 Women have traditionally brought wealth to their marriage in the form of a dowry in India (Goody 1973). 
Whatever other functions the dowry serves, it could enhance the marriageability of a female in the marriage market 
as well as proxy for her unobserved traits such as beauty. Thus, to examine the role of dowry in sorting individuals 
in the marriage market, the amount of dowry (D) transferred by the bride household to the groom household is in-
cluded along with the bride’s age and years of schooling to construct her marriageability index, viz: 
 
f
j
f
j
f
j DSA
j eF
)1( 2121     (5) 
 
 The following payoff matrix can represent the household commodity output produced by all possible mo-
nogamous matches: 
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where NMMM ,...,, 21  and NFFF ,...,, 21  refer to males and females of different qualities. With the quality 
measures of males and females given, the optimal assignment can be derived from maximizing the marital output 
over all marriages: 
 
MaxZ *  
ji
ijij Z
,
   (6) 
 
where ij  is the permutation matrix representing the number of matches of each type. If males and females are 
ranked in the same order, the higher their type the better, that is NMMM  ....21  and 
NFFF  ....21 , the only optimal solution to the maximization problem is to match males and females along 
the main “core” diagonal. In other words, ij , must be a diagonal matrix.  
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In the multivariate case, the parameters of the model   and   are also of interest as they not only reveal 
which traits have the largest effect on match formation but also indicate whether there is positive or negative assor-
tative mating with respect to the characteristics used in measuring each individual’s attractiveness in the marriage 
market. In particular, if 0 , positive assortative mating is optimal and the trait is categorized as a complement 
and if 0 , negative assortative mating is optimal and the trait is categorized as a substitute. For instance, if 
potential spouses differ in their age, positive assortative mating will characterize optimal sorting of partners if: 
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3.  Empirical Procedure 
 
To find the optimal pairing of men and women as defined by equation (6), the method of maximum likelih-
ood is utilized to estimate the household production function. To do so, index values of each type of male and fe-
male are first determined by using initial guess values for the parameters. The range of iM  and jF  is then parti-
tioned into five equal segments, for computational ease, to universally rank individuals in the marriage market such 
that, high type males (females) occupy the higher range of iM ( jF ), while the low-type males (females) are found 
in the lower range of iM ( jF ). That is, 54321 MMMMM   and 54321 FFFFF  . 
 
To illustrate the essence of efficiency in marriage markets, the match utility is defined explicitly over two 
types of production goods: 
 
);( YZUU    (8) 
 
where Z  is the household production technology and Y , represents the non-pecuniary production good, which is 
the indicator of marriage type, with 1,0Y . Marriages of 1Y  represent efficient matches i.e. matches along the 
main diagonal that maximize match utility, and marriages of 0Y  represent nonefficient matches. To derive the 
optimal marriage pairings of males and females the method of maximum likelihood is then used to estimate the fol-
lowing model: 
 
1Y  if )(WFFMFMZZ jiiiijijii     (9) 
0Y  if )(1 WFFMFMZZ jiiiijijii    
 
where jiii FMFMW  . 
 
The model is made operational by a particular choice of distribution for the disturbance. The disturbances 
are assumed to be independently and identically exponentially distributed. The log likelihood function is then given 
by: 
 




 
10
]1ln[]ln[ln
Y
W
Y
W eeL    (10) 
where 
2
2 1

  , variance of the exponential distribution, measures the dispersion in match production from the 
main diagonal.  
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4.  Description Of The Data 
 
To estimate the empirical model of spouse selection developed in this paper, data from a survey of house-
holds in India for a study titled “Poverty, Gender Inequality and Reproductive Choice” is used. The fieldwork for 
this study was carried out by the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER),
 
New Delhi, between 
July 1995 and September 1995. A total of 1078 households spread over 5 districts in Uttar Pradesh (north India) and 
800 households in 5 districts of Karnataka (south India) were surveyed on a range of issues covering social, econom-
ic and demographic features of households, as well as exercise of reproductive choice as seen through patterns of 
contraceptive use by couples in reproductive age groups. Districts were chosen to represent the agroclimatic diversi-
ties of each state. The study covered 35 villages in each state averaging 7-9 villages per district. After eliminating 
the households with missing data 1037 observations were left spread more or less evenly across the five districts of 
Uttar Pradesh and Karnataka.  
 
The term dowry has been employed in a number of ways in the literature. It is defined here to mean the net 
exchange of all cash and in-kind gifts made from the bride household to the groom household at the time of mar-
riage and the expenses incurred in marriage ceremonies by the bride household net of those incurred by the groom 
household. Additionally monetary transfers were made at vastly different points in time, with the earliest marriage 
dating to 1956 and the most recent to 1994. To deal with this problem, all net dowry values were converted to con-
stant 1994 prices.  
 
Descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the analysis are presented in Table 1. Numbers in the 
bottom row and last column refer to the means and standard deviations of the bride and groom characteristics re-
spectively. For instance, the grooms on average were older (by six years) and more educated (by approximately 
three years) than their brides and received a dowry of Rs. 1, 44,492.7 on average at the time of marriage. The corre-
lation coefficients between bride and groom traits are listed as the main elements of the cross table. Becker characte-
rizes all the traits considered in the empirical analysis as complements; positive correlations are observed on all of 
them. The correlations suggest that individuals like to pair with those who are similar to them with respect to all 
nonmarket traits, although this preference is stronger for age than schooling. 
 
5.  Results 
 
Parameter estimates of the household production function are reported in Table 2, column 1. Results sup-
port Becker’s prediction of positive assortative mating on nonmarket traits as coefficients of all observed spouse 
traits are positive. That is, results suggest that spouse age and schooling are complements in the household produc-
tion function. Of the observable characteristics, while the years of schooling of the groom has the largest effect on 
matching behavior, it is the age of the bride that affects mate selection and the organization of marriage markets in 
India.  
 
Such trade-offs between characteristics are expected, because husbands and wives have traditionally had 
different roles and each has emphasized different qualities in a marriage partner. Marriage has often been seen as the 
exchange of a man’s income earning potential, proxied in the matching process by his years of schooling, for a 
woman’s ability to bear children and manage a household, indicated by her age, which are rough proxies for her 
beauty and health (Bergstrom and Bagnoli 1993). It follows that the outcome of the process of mate selection is al-
most entirely driven by the economic assets of the male, his schooling, and the noneconomic assets of the female, 
her age. 
 
Table 3, Panel A, presents the estimated match matrix. The matches reveal the expected, though not strong, 
diagonal pattern indicating that thirty-four percent of the marriages in India occur between similar types of males 
and females. On an absolute basis, however, the phenomenon of assortative mating is strongest at the extremes, sug-
gesting a larger magnitude of marriages between young and illiterate males and females on one hand and older and 
more educated males and females on the other.  
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To examine the role of dowries in match formation in India, the estimates presented in Table 2, column 2 
include dowry along with age and years of schooling of a female in the construction of her marriageability index 
(see equation 5). The results suggest that positive assortative mating on all measured dimensions is the norm. More-
over, the results again imply that marriage markets in India operate to a large extent through the exchange of fe-
male’s age, characteristics signaling her beauty and health and thus reproductive potential, for male’s economic 
traits, which are based largely on his years of schooling and thus income earning potential. 
 
Table 3, Panel B presents the match matrix with dowry. The equilibrium sorting shows an increase in the 
number of matches along the diagonal from thirty-four percent in Panel A to thirty-eight percent in Panel B. This 
variation in the degree of assortative mating is expected, because as more characteristics of those marrying are con-
sidered, the shocks to match production should decrease and hence the matches in the marriage market should be-
come more and more symmetrical. This is also reflected in the degree of dispersion in the match production; a great-
er dispersion means more match heterogeneity. Results in Table 2 reveal that the shocks to match production de-
crease as dowry is introduced in the model. Thus, dowry increases the likelihood of women marrying men of similar 
type, thereby improving the efficiency of marriage markets in India.  
 
This is an important result as it lends support to the argument that dowries compensate for bride-groom 
quality differences. Prior research (Dalmia 2003) suggests that marriage transactions “equalize” the value of mar-
riage services exchanged by the households of the bride and groom. A possible explanation for the improved effi-
ciency of marriage markets in India with the introduction of dowry is that couples with equivalent index values need 
not be similar with respect to all characteristics relevant to spouse selection. Their overall similarity may result from 
a balance of pluses and minuses in different traits. Therefore, when a woman marries a man with more education, 
monetary transfers from her household to the groom and his household may increase her attractiveness in the mar-
riage market and hence accentuate her marriageability index. Thus, the prospect of such resources is likely to in-
crease matches between men and women of similar type, when considered on multivariate dimensions, and improve 
the efficiency of marriage markets in India.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
This paper examines how equilibrium sorting takes place in marriage markets in India. It constructs an em-
pirical model of spouse selection based on Becker’s (1973) efficient marriage market hypothesis, in which optimal 
assignments of marriage partners are derived from maximizing the household output function. By specifying a ma-
rital production function and introducing the influence of multiple individual characteristics simultaneously in the 
matching technology, this paper creates a matching algorithm and uses the estimated parameters to examine positive 
assortative mating with respect to nonmarket characteristics. To capture heterogeneity in personal characteristics and 
to measure how good a partner each individual will make, it constructs a marriage index for all males and females in 
the marriage market. It utilizes parametric techniques to universally rank men and women by their marital endow-
ment and forms match matrices based on this information.  
 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the structural model support Becker’s predictions of positive assorta-
tive mating with respect to age and years of schooling suggesting that these traits are complements in the household 
production function. Results also reveal that while the outcome of the process of mate selection is driven by the 
schooling of the groom, it is the age of the bride that has the largest affect on matching behavior in India. Most im-
portantly, results show that dowry increases the likelihood of women marrying men of similar type and hence in-
creases the efficiency of marriage markets in India. This is an important result, as it lends support to the equalizing 
differences role of marital arrangements in India (Dalmia 2003). Moreover, it has important policy implications for 
the institution of dowry in India.   
 
Journal Of Business & Economics Research Volume 2, Number 4 
 7 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Bride 
Groom Age Years of Schooling 
Net Dowry 
(1994 rupees) 
Mean 
(grooms) 
Age 0.723* 0.191* -0.088* 22.21 
     (5.36) 
Years of Schooling 0.112* 0.498* 0.101* 4.75 
    (4.76) 
Net Dowry -0.128* 0.04 1 144492.7 
     (166772.1) 
Mean 16.22 2.06 144492.7  
(brides) (3.73) (3.55) (166772.1)  
*Standard deviations in parenthesis 
 
 
Table 2:  Maximum Likelihood Estimates Of The 
Household Production Function 
 
 
Parameters 
Estimates 
Col. 1 Col. 2 
Groom's Age 0.336 0.467 
  (0.025) (0.026) 
Groom's Schooling 0.664 0.533 
  (0.025) (0.026) 
Bride's Age 0.724 0.602 
  (0.019) (0.010) 
Bride's Schooling 0.276 0.120 
  (0.019) (0.010) 
Dowry  0.278 
   (0.011) 
Variance 68.30 20.23 
Log Likelihood -821.8 -781.3 
*Standard deviations in parenthesis 
 
 
Table 3:  Match Matrices 
 
Panel A: Without Dowry (34% on Diagonal) 
  F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 Total 
M1 97 52 45 11 2 207 
M2 38 56 42 52 19 207 
M3 38 32 51 46 40 207 
M4 24 47 45 47 44 207 
M5 10 20 24 51 102 207 
Total 207 207 207 207 207 1035 
Panel B: With Dowry (38% on Diagonal) 
  F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 Total 
M1 117 37 38 10 5 207 
M2 45 56 48 39 19 207 
M3 26 61 54 44 22 207 
M4 16 37 34 62 58 207 
M5 3 16 33 52 103 207 
Total 207 207 207 207 207 1035 
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